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Abstract: Numerous studies have dealt with the coding of information sources
within and across languages. These studies have shown that despite the sig-
nificant differences in the number of formally distinct evidentiality categories,
languages tend to have grammaticalized markers for certain information sour-
ces, but not for others; different kinds of sensory perception, inference, assump-
tion and hearsay evidence are among those information sources that receive
explicit coding. In this paper, another evidence type, namely general knowl-
edge, will be examined. It will be shown that general knowledge differs from
other information sources in its nature, but it also has features in common with
them. In addition, a formal-functional typology of general knowledge coding
will be proposed based on the nature of the element used for this purpose.
Finally, the rationale behind the discussed types and the central theoretical
implications of the paper will be discussed. The attested types either stress the
peculiar nature of general knowledge providing evidence for its independent
information source status, or they emphasize the common features shared by
general knowledge and other information sources, most notably reliability of
information.
Keywords: evidentiality, general knowledge, information source, typology
1 Introduction
Evidentiality as a linguistic category refers to the source of information speakers
have for their statements. Evidentiality can either be a grammaticalized, obliga-
torily expressed category, as, e. g. in Wutun, Tariana (see (1)) and Hup, or
languages may refer to the information source optionally by lexical means,
such as lexical verbs or particles, which is the case, for example, in, English,
German and Finnish (2). Consider:
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(1) Tariana
a. Juse iɾida di-manika-ka
Jose football 3SG.NF-play-REC.P.VIS
‘Jose has played football (we saw it)’
b. Juse iɾida di-manika-mahka
Jose football 3SG.NF-play-REC.P.NONVIS
‘Jose has played football (we heard it)’
c. Juse iɾida di-manika-nihka
Jose football 3SG.NF-play-REC.P.INFR
‘Jose has played football (we infer it from visual evidence)’
d. Juse iɾida di-manika-sika
Jose football 3SG.NF-play-REC.P.ASSUM
‘Jose has played football (we assume this on the basis of what we
already know)’
e. Juse iɾida di-manika-pidaka
Jose football 3SG.NF-play-REC.P.REP
‘Jose has played football (we were told)’
(Aikhenvald 2004: 2-3)
(2) Finnish
a. Jaakko on kuulemma fiksu
Jaakko COP.PRES.3SG hearsay smart
‘They say that Jaakko is smart’
b. Näen, että Aino piirtää hyvin
see.1SG.PRES that Aino draw.PRES.3SG well
‘I see that Aino is drawing well’
(personal knowledge)
Tariana is a language with a rather elaborate evidentiality system with five
grammatically marked categories, one of which is always marked on the verb.
In Finnish, evidentiality is expressed by (grammatically) fully optional particles,
or lexical verbs that express meanings similar to some Tariana evidentiality
markers. For example, in (2a), the hearsay particle is optional formally, even
though its use may be of the utmost importance pragmatically.
Earlier studies of evidentiality have shown that languages differ according
to what kind(s) of information source they code grammatically and how many
categories they distinguish explicitly (see, e. g. Willett 1988; Plungian 2010; and
especially; Aikhenvald 2004: Ch. 2). Despite the evident differences between
languages in this respect, previous studies have shown that the coded types of
information source are rather constant across languages, even though languages
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naturally vary according to how many distinctions they make. A list could look,
e. g. as below (proceeding from the most direct to the least direct evidence):
1. Ego-evidence
2. Visual evidence
3. Other sensory evidence (auditive, tactile, olfactory, gustatory)
4. Inference
5. Assumption
6. Quotation
7. Hearsay
The list above is based on the information sources usually discussed in studies of
evidentiality (the typology above is my own, even though it is based largely on
Aikhenvald (2004: 63–64), somewhat different typologies are found, for example,
in Willett 1988; and Plungian 2010 discussed below). The list thus provides us
with a rather exhaustive picture of how humans gather information about the
surrounding world and what kinds of information sources we use for our state-
ments and what kind of information sources receive linguistic coding (see also the
discussion of Plungian below). First of all, we are personally involved in numer-
ous states-of-affairs every day, in which case our own (volitional) participation in
a given event serves as our information source, as in I am working on this paper or
tomorrow I will eat fish for dinner. This corresponds to the definition of ego-
evidence in this paper; ego-evidence refers to the speaker’s own (usually voli-
tional) participation in the event denoted (the evidence type has also been labeled
as participatory evidence or egophoricity in later studies). It is, however, impor-
tant to note that ego-evidence is not always seen as a genuine information source,
and, for example, Aikhenvald (2004) does not consider it in her study. In this
paper, ego-evidence/egophoricity is taken into account, because it is a formally
distinct category in languages such as Wutun and Tibetan (see also, e. g. Floyd
et al. (2018), for more studies), and it is also directly relevant to general knowledge
coding. Moreover, we make numerous statements based on our own actions, as
we do based on, e. g. visual evidence or hearsay, which further speaks in favor of
considering ego-evidence as an information source in its own right.
Second, sensory perception is an important way of gathering information
about the world; we constantly witness states-of-affairs by seeing, hearing,
feeling, touching and smelling. Our senses differ according to their importance
and reliability, and it is no surprise that many languages give visual information
special status treating it as the most direct (and reliable) information source.
Some languages also have an auditive evidential used for auditory sensory
evidence (see, e. g. Jalava 2017 for Tundra Nenets), but no language has a
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distinct evidential for olfactory, gustatory or tactile evidence. In addition to
observing events directly, we can infer causal relations between different events
(inference) and/or assume something less directly based, e. g. on our knowledge
of the world (assumption). Inference presents more direct evidence than
assumption, since inference is based on less controversial evidence leaving
less room for speculation (Barnes (1984: 262) notes that in Tuyuca assumptive
evidential is used if the speaker has no evidence for his/her claim). Finally, we
may acquire information from others, in which case we are dealing with hearsay
or quotative information. In the first case, the information source is not
accounted for, while the information source is known for quotation. In
English, this corresponds roughly to the differences between they say that John
is sick (hearsay) and according to Lisa, John is sick (quotation).
Even though the examined information sources are above presented as
independent, it is important to note that the sources may overlap, and they
have features in common. This is manifested, for example, in the somewhat
different kind of taxonomy of information sources proposed by Plungian (2010:
37; see also Willett 1988):
Direct/personal (=attested, witnessed, firsthand, confirmative)
– Participatory/endophoric; common knowledge
– Visual (with subtypes)
– Non-visual (sensory)
Indirect/personal
– Inferential (based on observed results)
– Presumptive (based on plausible reasoning) (common knowledge)
Indirect/non-personal (secondhand)
– Reported (with subtypes)
As such, the information sources in Plungian’s typology are largely the same as
those proposed earlier. However, Plungian classifies the discussed information
sources based on their (in)directness and (non-)personal nature. It therefore
accounts better for the relations between information sources than the list
above. A crucial distinction is made based on whether the information is our
own or not; on the list above, types 1–3 represent direct information, while 4–7
correspond to indirect information on Plungian’s list. This is an important
distinction, because we can, for example, usually take responsibility for state-
ments based on our own evidence, while we cannot do this for information we
receive from others (see also, e. g. Aikhenvald 2002: 190). This difference is
relevant to the discussion in this paper, because general knowledge constitutes
the speaker’s personal information.
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In this paper, another kind of information source that has received less
attention in previous studies will be discussed. More precisely, the present paper
is concerned with general knowledge as an evidence type. The coding of general
knowledge (or facts depending on the source) is occasionally noted (see, e. g.
Faller 2002a; Aikhenvald 2004; Loughnane 2009; Plungian 2010; Gawne and
Hill 2017a), and the use of factual evidentials has been studied rather exten-
sively in Tibetan languages (see e. g. Oisel 2013,; Gawne and Hill 2017b for
studies of this), but to the best of my knowledge, cross-linguistic, systematic
in-depth studies focusing exclusively on general knowledge are lacking to date.
The primary goal of this paper is to show that semantically general knowledge
constitutes an evidence type of its own despite its partial similarity with other
instances of direct evidence. General knowledge comprises here pieces of infor-
mation that have become the speaker’s internal information, of which the
speaker has absolute subjective certainty, and for which s/he does not need
any kind of external evidence (see Section 2 for a more detailed definition).
General knowledge is thus viewed at least to some extent in the same way as in
the classification proposed by Plungian; it is seen as the speaker’s own (endo-
phoric) evidence (common knowledge in the first sense). General knowledge is
harder to classify based on one feature only, because, as will be discussed in
Section 4, general knowledge shares features with other information sources,
but its nature differs clearly from them in other respects. Here general knowl-
edge is primarily viewed via reliability; it is viewed as reliable evidence, since it
is the speaker’s own (endophoric) evidence the speaker has absolute certainty
of. This follows, in addition to other reasons discussed in detail in Section 2,
since general knowledge is in many languages coded by direct evidentials.
In addition to a semantic definition of general knowledge, its formal coding
along with the rationale behind this will be discussed. Most languages do not
code general knowledge with a formally distinct marker but use some of the
existing evidentiality markers for this (usually a marker of direct evidence). This
means that we often do not have formal evidence for the independent nature of
general knowledge. However, as will be shown, the use of the employed markers
is not random, but languages display clear tendencies in this respect. In other
words, the features general knowledge has in common with other information
sources are manifested in its linguistic coding. Finally, the relevance of the
discussion in this paper to our general understanding of evidentiality will be
discussed.
A few methodological/terminological remarks are in order before proceed-
ing. First of all, it is important to note that the states-of-affairs briefly described
above could be labeled as both facts and general knowledge. Neither term is
completely without problems, but in this paper, I have opted for using the term
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general knowledge. This follows primarily, because general knowledge accounts
for the type of evidence discussed better. The label fact is associated too much
with certainty, which means that also events that we are witnessing ourselves as
we speak, or our own inner states could be seen as facts, since we “know them
for a fact”. However, these states-of-affairs are not discussed in this paper,
because they do not constitute general knowledge, which also speaks in favor
of choosing the term general knowledge for the type of evidence examined here.
Second, it is important to note that even though the present paper discusses
data from various languages, it is not a genuine typological paper in that its
findings are not based on a carefully selected sample. The goals of the paper are
thus primarily theoretical in nature. The main reason for the unsystematic
nature of data collection is that the linguistic coding of general knowledge is
not always discussed in the consulted sources. Third, the discussion of general
knowledge in Section 2 concerns only basic cases, i. e. indisputable pieces of
general knowledge. Pieces of information that have just become known to the
speaker and whose information status is thus somewhat different, will not be
discussed, even though they are occasionally used as a basis of comparison.
Following from this, the typology proposed in Section 3 is based on clear cases
as well.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, semantics of
general knowledge will be discussed including both similarities with and differ-
ences from other information sources. Section 3 proposes a formal-functional
typology of general knowledge coding based on the functional nature of the
element used for this purpose. Section 4 examines the rationale behind the
attested types, and finally Section 5 summarizes the central findings of the
paper.
2 Semantics of general knowledge
2.1 Preliminaries
In this section, I will define in detail what I mean by general knowledge. This
also includes a discussion of the most important differences from along with
certain similarities between general knowledge and other information sources,
i. e. what renders something general knowledge, and how these pieces of infor-
mation differ from other information sources will be scrutinized. The goal of this
section is to show that semantically general knowledge constitutes an informa-
tion source in its own right. It is also in order to note that the speaker usually
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has a reason for coding something as general knowledge, s/he may, e. g. wish to
stress the reliability of the given claim, even though another kind of coding
would be possible. However, the discussion below will be centered round the
semantics of general knowledge instead of pragmatics.
General knowledge is in this paper defined as pieces of information that
fulfill the following criteria:
1. General knowledge is a part of the speaker’s established world view (even
though it is originally based on external evidence). It constitutes the speak-
er’s internal information, and the speaker has subjective certainty of the
truth value of the given information.
2. The speaker can refer to general knowledge without any kind of external
evidence (sensory/hearsay evidence, inference, assumption). This also
makes general knowledge more stable and less time-dependent than other
sources of information, since no external evidence is needed. We can freely
choose when we refer to general knowledge.
3. General knowledge is based on the speaker’s previous experiences of the
world, but the original source of information (which can be of any of the
types discussed above) does not need to (or even cannot) be specified.
According to the definition above, 2 + 2 is 4 and Stockholm is the capital of
Sweden constitute paradigm cases of general knowledge, since these are both
generally known facts about the world. Also states-of-affairs such as John and
Lisa have two children and Lisa is a professor of mathematics may equally well be
general knowledge to those who know these states-of-affairs based on their
previous experiences. On the other hand, John is shopping at the moment is
not general knowledge, because we need some kind of external evidence for this
statement, and the statement holds true only as long as John is shopping. It is
important to note that basically the same piece of information can be general
knowledge or, e. g. visually evidenced event, as is exemplified, e. g. by Lisa and
John are jogging in the park. In case we see Lisa and John jogging in the park for
the first time, we are dealing with a statement based on visual evidence, and not
general knowledge. On the other hand, if we know that John and Lisa jog
regularly in the park, and not, e. g. in a forest, we are dealing with general
knowledge. Whether we are dealing with general knowledge or not is thus not
determined solely by the nature of events. The nature of evidence changes when
a piece of information becomes general knowledge. In the second case, we can
make the statement Lisa and John are jogging in the park regardless of time and
place, while in the first case we need evidence for our claim (see also Zemp 2017:
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268–269 for the use of factual and direct testimony markers in Purik Tibetan).
Below, I will discuss the three features of general knowledge in more detail.
2.2 Subjective certainty
In principle, all states-of-affairs we have been involved in, and for which we
thus have some kind of evidence potentially constitute general knowledge.
However, only a very small percentage of all possible states-of-affairs are gen-
uinely general knowledge for us. This follows, because general knowledge is a
part of our established world view, and this applies only to those states-of-affairs
we find relevant enough. For example, if we have a Facebook account, we are
informed of friends’ birthdays regularly, but we usually rather quickly forget
who was born when, which renders the use of external evidence necessary. Only
the birthdays of our closest friends usually become general knowledge for us.
Our own internal world is different from that of all other speakers, which has the
consequence that people differ drastically as to what they may code as general
knowledge. Frequency of occurrence and habituality are highly relevant in this
regard; states-of-affairs that occur frequently in our immediate environment
easily become general knowledge for us. This is formally manifest, for example,
in Turkish, where the non-firsthand evidential no longer appears with reported
information, when the given piece of information has become a part of the
speaker’s general knowledge (Aksu-Koç and Slobin 1986). Similar cases have
been reported, e. g. for Yukaghir (Maslova 2003: 229) and Mamainde (Eberhard
2012).
As noted above, the speaker has subjective certainty of his/her general
knowledge. In other words, the speaker knows a certain state-of-affairs to hold
even though s/he has no direct evidence for it as s/he speaks. For example, we
may have subjective certainty of the fact that Stockholm is the capital of Sweden
even though we have no concrete evidence for this as we speak. Subjectivity has
the, sometimes unfortunate, consequence that we may believe something to be
general knowledge (and a fact), even though this is not true objectively. For
example, someone may think that the capital of Australia is Sydney, even
though this “fact” does not reflect the actual state-of-affairs in the world. The
objective truth value is thus sometimes secondary, but the speaker’s own sub-
jective certainty determines whether s/he chooses to code something as general
knowledge. It is, however, important to note that the linguistic coding of general
knowledge is not random, and the speaker must believe that his/her own beliefs
coincide with the actual factuality of information. For example, we do not (if
we act rationally) view something like two plus two is seventeen as general
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knowledge/fact, because we know this to be false, and we thus cannot have
subjective certainty of it. Related to this, we may also forget things that have
been general knowledge for us. For example, if we do not need chemistry after
school, we will probably forget most of the periodic table. We may, e. g. need to
rely on some external evidence for the symbol of Tellurium, in which case this is
no longer general knowledge for us. In other words, general knowledge is
something we have absolute subjective certainty of at the moment when we
refer to a given state of affairs.
Finally, the subjective nature of general knowledge is related to the way in
which the speaker chooses to refer to a certain piece of information.
Representing something as general knowledge is usually a deliberate choice
with a clear communicative function (other means may also be available, see,
e. g. Eberhard 2012 for Mamainde; Yliniemi 2017 for the use of the different
copulas in Denjongke). For example, the speaker may wish to underline his/
her certainty of a specific piece of information, or s/he may wish to communi-
cate that no other kind of evidence is needed, and/or s/he is no longer aware of
the original source. In general, the speaker does not refer to a piece of informa-
tion as general knowledge (or fact) in case s/he cannot take responsibility for
his/her claim.
2.3 Lack of external evidence
The internal nature of general knowledge has the very natural consequence that
we do not need external evidence for referring to these pieces of information.
The only kind of evidence we need, and can have, for general knowledge is our
own internal, subjective certainty about the denoted state of affairs (see also
Stenzel 2008: 425 for Wanano, where the assertion evidential used also for fact
coding is used whenever the speaker has no external evidence). Referring to any
other kind of evidence deprives a piece of information of its status as general
knowledge. Lack of external evidence constitutes a very clear difference to other
information sources; we need visual evidence for using the visual evidential,
while no evidence is needed for general knowledge. This also drastically
changes the nature of the evidence, and thus underlines the special nature of
general knowledge.
The lack of external evidence makes general knowledge independent of time
and place; we can freely choose when and where to use our internal evidence as
a basis for a statement. In other words, we do not need to wait for the right
moment for stating Gaborone is the capital of Botswana, but we can do this
whenever this is relevant. For all other types of evidence, we have to rely on
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external evidence, whose availability we cannot determine. We thus cannot say
John is coming or it is raining whenever we wish (if we really mean what we say),
but this is possible only under the right circumstances. This is also relevant to
the two readings of Lisa and John are jogging in the park noted above (claims
based on visual evidence are time- and place-dependent). Moreover, general
knowledge applies as long as we have no evidence to the contrary. Put con-
cretely, evidence for general knowledge is the same at moment 1 and moment 2,
while for other states-of-affairs the nature of the evidence may vary depending
on the context (e. g. it may rain at moment 1, while it does not rain at moment 2).
Certain pieces of general knowledge belong to the past, such as Bonn was the
capital of West Germany, but as long as the truth value of a piece of information
is constant, and no external evidence is needed, it constitutes general knowl-
edge for the speaker.
Lack of external evidence and the closely related independence of time and
place make an important contribution to what can become general knowledge
for us. Probably the paradigm case of general knowledge is illustrated by
scientific facts, such as 2 + 2 is 4 and the Earth orbits the Sun. These facts
apply regardless of time and place, and (at least in principle) we cannot have
disconfirming evidence for them, which makes the differences between external
and internal evidence irrelevant. Second, states-of-affairs such as John and Lisa
have two children and Lisa is an English teacher are also rather constant in
nature. Third, events that occur habitually in our immediate environment
often become internalized. For example, if we see Lisa arrive at her office
every day wearing a biking helmet, we may deduce Lisa comes to work by bike
to hold generally. The least likely candidates for general knowledge are illus-
trated by states-of-affairs in constant flux. Examples include, e. g. the likes of it
is raining heavily now and John is at a conference in Kiel. These are not constant
states, but the rain may stop at any point and John will leave Kiel eventually.
Due to the temporary nature of these events, we cannot base any statement on
general knowledge, but concrete (external) evidence is needed. The same
applies to states-of-affairs that have not happened yet. However, also these
states-of-affairs may become general knowledge for us after they have hap-
pened, and for example it rained heavily on August 17, 2017 may be general
knowledge for us, for example, because we will always remember this, since the
rain ruined our garden party.
Even though the basic semantics of events contributes to the likelihood of
something being general knowledge for us, it is important to bear in mind
that the lack of external evidence is the key feature here. As stated above, the
same piece of information may be based, e. g. on visual evidence, or it may
be general knowledge for us. For example, the statement Lisa is a vegetarian
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may be based on inference (at a barbecue Lisa eats only salad and tofu), or
Lisa may have told us this herself. A different example is provided by, e. g.
the children are playing outside. The differences in the information sources are
very relevant, for example, in that only a statement based on recent visual
evidence can be an answer to the question where are the children?. Whether
these pieces of information are viewed as general knowledge or not is due to
whether we refer to them via internal or external evidence (contested knowl-
edge). In this respect, general knowledge resembles any other information
source, since basically all our statements can be based on any kind of
information source (our own emotions being a possible exception).
However, general knowledge differs from other information sources in that
the difference between general knowledge and any other information source
is between internal and external evidence, while with, e. g. visual and hear-
say evidence, the evidence is external in both cases. These differences are
formally manifest, e. g. in Purik Tibetan:
(3) Purik Tibetan
a. zamb-e-r-i-ka pulispa joŋ-s duk/jot
bridge-GEN-DEM-GEN-LOC police.man come-PAST EX.T/EX.F
‘(I saw / I know that) there are policemen by the bridge.’
b. k ʰo-a zbri-a rgjala duk/jot
(s)he-DAT write-INF good EX.T/EX.F
‘(I saw / I know that) (s)he’s good at writing.’
(Zemp 2017: 269)
In both examples above, duk refers to contested knowledge, something the
speaker has just learnt. For example, in (3a), the speaker has just seen some
policemen near the bridge. Jot, in turn, presents the given piece of information
as general knowledge. For example, in (3a), the speaker knows that policemen
are usually standing by the bridge and s/he does not need any kind of other
evidence for his/her claim (see Yliniemi 2017 for similar examples in Denjongke).
2.4 Neutralization/irrelevance of information source
Neutralization of the information source means basically that the original source
of information has no bearing on the reliability of an utterance. This may have at
least three different reasons. First, neutralization means that potential differ-
ences in the original information source are not relevant; speaker A may have
learnt a piece of general knowledge by hearsay, while speaker B has visual
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evidence for it. However, when the given information has genuinely become
general knowledge for both, these differences are no longer relevant, and both
speakers have absolute subjective certainty of the given piece of information. In
this respect, general knowledge differs drastically from other information sour-
ces. For example, the claim John is at home is more reliable if we have visual
evidence for this than if we are making a claim based on hearsay evidence.
Neutralization follows very naturally here, because we may only have one kind
of evidence (i. e. our own internal information) for general knowledge, while the
nature of evidence for other statements varies.
Second, the speaker may have many different types of evidence (e. g. both
hearsay and visual evidence) for general knowledge, and s/he cannot rank them
according to their relevance. For example, in Wutun (see (6)), this often deter-
mines the use of factual evidentials (coding general knowledge) that are used
whenever the original information source is not important, or the speaker is
unable to specify it. Moreover, intersubjectivity plays a role in Wutun, and
factual evidentials are more common whenever the speaker expects a certain
piece of information to be general knowledge to the hearer as well (Erika
Sandman, p.c.).
Third, a given piece of information may be a part of the common knowl-
edge of the speaker’s cultural environment, and no-one can state the original
information source anymore. What matters at the present moment is the
speaker’s subjective absolute certainty, its exact source plays no role. There
is thus no urgent need to specify the information source for general knowl-
edge of this type, whereas this may be highly relevant for other information
sources.
Even though the original information source has typically been neutralized
for general knowledge in the ways discussed above, it is important to note that
the original source may also affect the coding of general knowledge in some
languages. For example, in Denjongke, the use of copulas varies according to
whether a piece of general knowledge has become a part of the speaker’s
established world view via hearsay (something that everyone knows) or via
personal experience; the copula jø ̀ʔ is used if the claim is based on personal
experience, while jɛ ̀bbɛʔ appears if the speaker bases his/her claim on general
knowledge heard from someone else (Yliniemi 2017).
2.5 Interim summary
In this section, general knowledge has been defined as pieces of information
that have become the speaker’s internal information, which renders the given
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information certain and makes external evidence unnecessary. However, even
though general knowledge can be given a seemingly homogeneous definition, it
is important to note that it does not constitute an invariable evidence type, but
we can distinguish between at least two different types of general knowledge.
The first type, which probably constitutes the prototype of general knowledge, is
presented by generally known truths, such as scientific, historical and geo-
graphical facts. The second type of general knowledge is illustrated by states-
of-affairs that have become parts of our established world view based on our
personal experiences of the world. Typical examples include John is a linguist
and Lisa supports the Pittsburgh Penguins. As such, both types equally well
represent the notion of general knowledge, but they also display differences.
First, the two types of general knowledge differ from each other in what
kind of information we typically have, or can have, for them. We typically
(yet not always) learn scientific facts in school or from other reliable sources,
while we usually have personal experience for the second type. Moreover,
the nature of evidence for the second type of general knowledge may vary,
and we may claim that John has two children based on any type of evidence.
On the other hand, we usually do not base our claims on scientific facts on,
e. g. inference or assumption, but we learn them from an authority.1
Consequently, we less often question scientific facts and they readily become
general knowledge for us. On the other hand, a state-of-affairs becomes
general knowledge of the second type easier, if we have reliable evidence
for it. Differences in the original information source thus contribute to how
easily something becomes general knowledge especially as regards the sec-
ond type.
Second, the two types of general knowledge differ from each other in that
contradicting evidence affects the truth value of the second type rather easily,
while scientific facts are more stable in nature. For example, if we learn (from a
reliable source) that John and Lisa have moved to Dunedin, the statement John
and Lisa live in Canberra is no longer true, and we need to change our world
view accordingly. On the other hand, if someone tells us that Paimio is the
capital of Finland, or we see an anteater eating something else than ants,
Helsinki is the capital of Finland and anteater eats ants nevertheless remain
parts of our general knowledge. Moreover, we may presume generally known
scientific facts to be known by the hearer as well, while with the second type of
general knowledge this is not necessarily the case (see also Section 4.2 for a
discussion of this difference).
1 Scientists may naturally, at least at earlier stages of research, base their claims on inference.
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The semantic differences between the two types of general knowledge dis-
cussed in this section are also linguistically relevant. First of all, scientific facts
are most naturally referred to in the present tense and indicative mood. This also
applies to the second type of general knowledge whenever a given state-of-
affairs holds, but their coding is not as constant, since the states-of-affairs they
refer to may change, and thus past tense is possible with them (2 + 2 was 4
sounds odd, while John and Lisa were married does not). Second, the types of
general knowledge differ in their coding as general knowledge. For example, in
Wutun factual evidential occurs most often with the second type, e. g. to refer to
states-of-affairs the speaker has learnt based on their frequent occurrence (Erika
Sandman, p.c.). This distribution may seem somewhat unexpected at first,
because the prototype of general knowledge is left unmarked. However, this
becomes more natural if we consider the semantics of scientific facts. We know
without any explicit coding that 2 + 2 is four is a fact, which makes it unneces-
sary to underline this linguistically. In a similar vein, we may dispense with case
marking if the semantic role assignment of the participants is clear, as in ‘Lisa
saw the rock’. Second, the differences between contested and uncontested
evidence may be communicatively relevant, which may render it important to
highlight the factual nature of our statement linguistically. This may be neces-
sary also for other reasons, e. g. for underlining the general validity of the given
piece of information. These differences do not exist for the first type of general
knowledge.
In addition to the two discussed types of general knowledge, folklore, or
traditional stories of one’s own people, can also be seen as a type of general
knowledge, because folklore is a part of the history of one’s own people.
Folklore resembles the first type of general knowledge in that we are usually
not able to specify its original source, but there are also clear differences. One of
the most important differences is represented by the story-like nature of folklore.
Folklore may be viewed as stories of one’s own people, which has clear con-
sequences for their nature. From this it also follows that it is basically impossible
to have any (dis)confirming evidence for it, which is in principle always avail-
able for the second type of general knowledge, and for a part of the first type.
These differences are also linguistically manifest, and the coding of folklore
differs drastically from the other types of general knowledge; general knowledge
is consistently coded by direct evidentials, whereas there is massive variation for
folklore, and indirect evidentials are far more frequent with folklore (see Kittilä
in prep.). We may thus say that folklore is coded based on its origin (hearsay)
rather than its reliability, which is a clear contrast to general knowledge. Due to
the above mentioned semantic and formal differences, folklore is not discussed
further in this paper.
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3 A formal-functional typology of general
knowledge coding
3.1 Preliminaries
In this section, a formal-functional typology of general knowledge coding is
proposed based on the nature of the element used for this. Five types will be
distinguished. In the typology, visual and direct evidentials have been lumped
together because of their semantic similarity. Either label is used depending on
the language and the terminological choices by the author, but usually the
given marker comprises both direct and visual evidence (regardless of the
label), which makes an explicit distinction unnecessary. In this section, the
focus lies on the typology, the rationale behind the types will be discussed in
Section 4.
A few methodological notes are in order. First, the discussion below only
considers the coding of the two first types of general knowledge. This fol-
lows, because the status of the third type as general knowledge is question-
able, as noted in Section 2.5. Considering the third type could yield a
distorted picture of general knowledge coding. Potential differences in the
coding of the two first types will not be discussed, because the goal is to
illustrate the formal means languages employ for coding general knowledge.
Moreover, differences between different types of general knowledge are usu-
ally not discussed in the consulted sources. Second, general knowledge
coding is related to other linguistic elements as well, and it would thus be
possible to discuss the formal means also, e. g. from the perspective of
modality (indicative mood usually codes general knowledge). However, in
this paper the focus lies solely on evidentiality, and any other related feature
is not taken into account. It is also important to note that the proposed types
differ in size, but this is considered secondary, because the goal is to
illustrate the possible mechanisms. Finally, the typology is based only on
markers of evidentiality that can somehow be considered grammatical.
Evidential particles are (occasionally) considered, but purely lexical items,
such as definitely and without a doubt fall outside the scope of this paper.
Moreover, I will not discuss assertives, even though they can in many cases
be used to underline the factual nature of a piece of information. This
follows, because assertives are not necessary for referring to general knowl-
edge, even though they may appear with it.
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3.2 Type 1: Dedicated general knowledge marker
The first (and the least controversial) type is illustrated by languages that have a
dedicated grammatical marker for the expression of general knowledge.
Consider:
(4) Mamainde
a. wa3kon3-Ø-na2he3-la2
work-3SG-VIS.PAST-PERF
‘He worked (yesterday; I saw him)’
b. wa3kon3-Ø-nũ2he3-la2
work-3SG-INFR.PAST-PERF
‘He worked (yesterday; I inferred this based on visual evidence)’
c. ti3ka3l-a2 kai3l-a yain-Ø-te2ju2he3-la2
anteater-DEF ant-DEF eat-3SG-GEN.KNOWLEDGE.EV-PERF
‘The anteater habitually eats ants (I know this as general knowledge)’
d. wa3kon3-Ø-ta1hxai2he3-la2
work-3SG-REP.PAST-PERF
‘He worked (I was told)’
(Kroeker 2001: 62–65, as cited in Aikhenvald 2004: 56)
(5) Central Pomo
a. čhé mul=ʔma
rain fall=GEN.KNOWLEDGE
‘It rained (that’s an established fact)
b. čhé mul=ya
rain fall=VIS
‘It rained (I know because I was there and saw it)
c. čhé mul=ʔdo
rain fall=REP
‘It rained (I was told)’
d. čhé mul=nme
rain fall=AUD
‘It rained (I heard the drops on the roof)’
e. čhé mul=ʔka
rain fall=INFR
‘It must have rained (everything is wet)’
(Mithun 1999: 181, glosses my own)
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(6) Wutun
a. ngu huan he-di-yek
1SG food drink-PROGR-EGO
‘I am eating.’
b. gu huan he-di-li
3SG food drink-PROGR-SEN.INF
‘S/he is eating.’
c. gu selang-ha lhojjhong-qhi-de re
3SG Xining-FOC study-go.COMPL-ASS FACT
‘S/he will go to Xining for study (as we all know).’
(Sandman 2016: 207, Erika Sandman, p.c.)
Mamainde, Central Pomo and Wutun are all languages with an obligatory,
grammaticalized evidentiality system. Regardless of the number of formally
distinct evidentiality categories (which varies from three to five, as can be
seen above), the languages above have a dedicated marker for general knowl-
edge (labelled factual evidential in Sandman 2016). Similar cases are also
attested in Mosuo (Lidz 2007: 60), Darma (Willis 2007: 96–97), many Tibetan
languages (see, e. g. Zemp 2017: 262 for Purik Tibetan), and Japhug (Jacques
2015). Japhug presents an interesting case, because the general knowledge
marker may also be used for coding events that are very likely to take place in
the future.
A somewhat different example is provided by Kashaya Pomo illustrated
in (7):
(7) Kashaya Pomo
a. qowaq-wa
pack-FACT
‘(I see) he is packing.’
b. qowaq-ya
pack-VIS
‘(I just saw) he packed.’
c. sihta=yachma cahno-w.
bird=PL:SUBJ sound-FACT
‘Birds sing’ (general statement about birds) or ‘(I see/saw) birds are/
were singing.’ (imperfective action)
(Oswalt 1986: 36, 244, as cited in de Haan 2001)
As the examples in (7a) and (7c) show, Kashaya Pomo has a factual evidential
(Oswalt’s label) that can be used for referring to general knowledge, as shown
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in (7c). What distinguishes Kashaya Pomo from the other languages discussed in
this subsection is that factual evidentials can also code visual evidence (in
which case they resemble Type 3 languages), which is manifested in the two
readings given for (7c), and the reading of (7a). Moreover, the visual evidential
((7b)) cannot denote a generally known fact, but it appears with “perfective or
completed actions which the speaker knows to be true because he saw them
happen.” (Oswalt 1961: 244). Visual and factual evidential also display aspectual
differences; factual evidential appears with imperfective and visual with perfec-
tive actions (Oswalt 1986: 36).
3.3 Type 2: Ego-evidential
The second type is illustrated by languages in which the evidential marker usually
used for deliberate actions by a first person referent (ego-evidential)2 is used for
coding general knowledge as well. An illustrative example is provided in (8):
(8) Oksapmin
a. nox […] əbop dap=si dum-m sxa-sux
1S rope long=with tie-SEQ look.after-HAB.PER.FP.SG
‘I used to tie him up with rope and look after him.’
b. aw-xenil ixile dik j=olxol
grandparent.1POSS-PL 3P.POSS time DEM.DST=3SG.M.REFL
nuxul kukumi jox moxe-sxe
1PL.EX bride.price DEF buy-HAB.PER.FP.PL
‘In the elders’ time, we used to pay bride price.’
(Loughnane 2009: 254–257)
In (8a), the personal-factual marker -sux codes an event the speaker has been
personally involved in and that s/he has initiated with intent. In (8b), an allomorph
of the same marker is used for referring to general knowledge known to the people
of the community. Functionally, general knowledge coding of Oksapmin is close to
the languages of the first type in that both have a dedicated marker for general
knowledge. However, in Oksapmin, the given marker is not confined to general
knowledge coding, but it also covers purposefully instigated actions by a first
person referent, i. e. it is not a pure factual/general knowledge evidential. It is
also noteworthy that in Wutun (see (6)), and many Tibetan languages, these two
2 The term used by Loughnane is personal-factual evidential, but I have replaced it with ego-
evidential for coherence in terminology.
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categories do not overlap, but ego-evidential and factual evidential are formally
distinct. Type 2 seems to be rather rare across languages, even though similar cases
are attested (the references cited as in Loughnane 2009: 251–253) also in Foe (Rule
1977: 74) and Fasu (Loeweke and May 1980).
A somewhat different manifestation of Type 2 is given in (9) (the language
also has an inferential and a hearsay evidential):
(9) nDrapa
a. ˉwore ˋwo ˊɴgaɴgu ˋce ˊɕu=ɖ-ɛ.
every.year tax give need=IPF-DISJ
‘We need to pay our taxes every year.’
b. ˊjenʌ ˉŋoro ˉʜtɛwu ˉgʌ-ʔdj-a.
yesterday 3SG PN DIR-arrive-[a]
‘He arrived at Tau yesterday (I saw him arrive).’
(Shirai 2007: 133, 135)
In nDrapa, general knowledge is formally zero coded, as shown in (9a), while
visual information is explicitly marked, as evidenced by the direct evidential in
(9b). In principle, zero coding of general knowledge would render (9) an exam-
ple of Type 4 (see below), but (9) is viewed as an instance of Type 2, because
ego-evidential is zero coded in nDrapa, and the only difference between
Oksapmin and nDrapa lies in the zero vs. explicit coding of ego-evidentials.
In this subsection, languages, where ego-evidentials code general knowl-
edge have been discussed. Ego-evidentials are not always seen as a genuine
information source, and they are, e. g. not considered in Aikhenvald’s (2004)
seminal study. They have also been viewed as a part of person marking systems
(see, e. g. Hale 1980). However, in this paper, ego-evidentials are seen as an
information source in their own right, primarily for four reasons. First, they do
constitute an obligatorily coded information source type in languages such as
Wutun, and many Tibetan languages, similarly to, e. g. visual and hearsay
evidence in other languages. Second, they can appear with other persons as
well (with somewhat different meanings), which means that they do not con-
stitute a mere person marking device. Third, in languages with grammaticalized
ego-evidentials, ego-evidentials are in contrast with other information sources,
and we can make statements based on our own volitional involvement in an
event in the same way as our claims can be based on, e. g. hearsay evidence.
Finally, ego-evidence resembles general knowledge in that in both cases the
evidence is speaker-internal, even though in other respects these information
sources display clear differences.
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3.4 Type 3: Visual/direct evidential
The third type is illustrated by languages where general knowledge is coded by
the visual/direct evidential marker of the given language. Examples are found in
(10) and (11):
(10) Tucano
bũhîpũu opâ-sɨtɨ dî-bĩ
sun anaph.CL:ROUND be-PRES.VIS.3SG.M
‘The Sun is round’
(Ramirez 1997, vol. I: 127, as cited in Aikhenvald 2004: 170)
(11) Cuzco Quechua
Yunka-pi-n k'usillu-kuna-qa ka-n
rainforest-LOC-DIR monkey-PL-TOP be-3P
‘In the rainforest, there are monkeys’
(Faller 2002a: 20)
Despite the semantic differences between the denoted states-of-affairs, a visual/
direct evidential is used for their coding. The employed markers are despite their
obvious similarities, also somewhat different in nature. In Tucano, the marker of
visual evidence also codes tense simultaneously, while in Cuzco Quechua, the
given marker is a pure evidential. The use of visual/direct evidentials for general
knowledge is rather common in languages and cases similar to those in (10)–(11)
are also attested in, e. g. Tsafiki (Aikhenvald 2004: 172, information from Connie
Dickinson), Tuyuca (Barnes 1984: 259), Shipibo-Konibo (Valenzuela 2003: 35),
and Wanano (Stenzel 2008: 416).
3.5 Type 4: Zero marking
The fourth type is illustrated by languages in which general knowledge is coded
by zero. Zero coding means that general knowledge is referred to by construc-
tions without any kind of evidential marker regardless of whether the given
language has some form of grammaticalized evidentiality or not. In addition, the
general factual nature can be stressed by assertives or expressions such as I
know for a fact that … or everybody knows that … . However, as noted also above,
these are not considered here, because they are not necessary, but zero coding
suffices. In principle, languages such as nDrapa (see also LaPolla 2003: 198–199
for Qiang) could also be classified as zero marking languages, but here the
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notion is confined to languages where evidentiality is not in any way obliga-
torily coded, and optional evidentials do not appear with general knowledge. In
languages like nDrapa and Qiang, zero marking is a part of the evidentiality
paradigm with a clear function. In languages discussed in this section, in turn,
zero is not directly related to any kind of evidentiality value, but the exact
reading of zero is determined contextually. Two different examples of Type 4
are given in (12) and (13):
(12) Finnish
a. Maa kiertää Aurinko-a
Earth orbit.3SG.PRES sun-PART
‘The Earth orbits the Sun’
b. kaksi plus kaksi on neljä
two plus two COP.3SG.PRES four
‘Two plus two is four’
(personal knowledge)
(13) Korean
a. welington-i nyucilaynd-ui suto-ta
Wellington-NOM NZ-GEN capital-IND
‘Wellington is the capital of New Zealand’
b. i tehaki i-un sa-ta
two adding two-TOP four-IND
‘Two plus two is four’
(examples courtesy of Jae Jung Song)
Finnish and Korean differ in their evidentiality expression. In Finnish, eviden-
tiality is a not a grammaticalized category, but the information source is referred
to by evidential particles (e. g. inferential and hearsay) or lexical verbs (‘see’,
‘hear’ etc.). Korean, in turn, displays grammaticalized evidentiality (verb affixes
for direct, inferential and hearsay evidence), but, in contrast to the languages
discussed above, their use is not obligatory (Jae Jung Song, p.c.). Despite these
differences, general knowledge is formally zero coded in both languages; the
Finnish evidential particles and the Korean evidential affixes do not appear with
general knowledge. It should be noted that in Finnish and Korean (maybe along
with many other languages of this type), zero marking is not directly and/or
exclusively related to general knowledge. For example, in Finnish, zero also
codes ego-evidence, visual evidence and most other instances of highly reliable
information regardless of its exact nature. Zero coding can be considered the
default, and it occurs if there is no need to specify that we are not dealing with
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direct information. Moreover, it should be noted that optional markers of evi-
dentiality are by no means excluded with general knowledge in Finnish and
Korean. However, their appearance has obvious semantic consequences. For
example, in Finnish the use of hearsay evidential creates the impression that
the speaker has just learnt the given piece of information. Type 4 is common
crosslinguistically, because basically all languages where evidentiality is an
optional category represent Type 4.
3.6 Variable type
Finally, there are languages where the coding of general knowledge varies
according to, e. g. the nature, or the origin of general knowledge. Two examples
are illustrated in (14) and (15):
(14) Purik Tibetan
a. ŋa-a pene maŋmo jot
I-DAT money a.lot EX.F
‘(I saw / I know that) I have a lot of money.’
b. ɲoskar tʰaq-pa-na mar biŋ-et
rape grind-INF-CND oil come.out-CRT
‘When you grind rape(seed), oil comes out.’
(Zemp 2017: 268, 281)
(15) Denjongke
a. bil gɛits=lo ny: kɛ:p jɛ ̀b-bɛʔ
Bill Gates=LOC money a.lot COP.EXT.NMLZ-COP.EQU.NE
‘Bill Gates has a lot of money (as is generally known)’
b. khui=ki baik=di lɛ ̀pti màlaʔ jø̀ʔ
his=GEN bike=DEMPH very fast COP.EXT.PERS
‘His motorbike is very fast’
(Yliniemi 2017)
In Purik Tibetan, the variation is between an existential copula and an affix, while
in Denjognke, the variation concerns two different copulas. In Purik, the (epistemi-
cally neutral factual) existential copula jot contrasts with the testimonial existential
copula duk used whenever the speaker is basing his/her claim on recent evidence.
The prospective certaintive affix – et, in turn, is also used for referring to events that
will certainly take place in the near future, i. e. the speaker has (subjective) certainty
of both these event types. In Denjongke, the variation is between neutral and
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personal copulas (terms from Yliniemi 2017). The neutral copula jɛ̀b-bɛʔ is used
when the speaker is making a general statement without any reference to concrete
evidence. This copula is thus a rather genuine general knowledge marker. The
personal jø̀ʔ, for its part, refers to the speaker’s already existing knowledge, and it
can be used only when it is possible to acquire personal information for the claim
over time (it is therefore not possible with historical facts). General knowledge is
often based on the speaker’s previous experiences, which makes jø̀ a general
knowledge marker as well.
4 Rationale
4.1 Preliminaries
In this section, the rationale behind the attested language types, and the status
of general knowledge as an information source will be scrutinized in more
detail. Also the relevance of the discussion to our general understanding of
evidentiality will be examined briefly. Before proceeding, it is important to note
that, as noted above as well, the language types proposed in the previous
section seem to differ enormously in size, which could naturally be taken as
evidence for a better motivation of the frequent types. However, the goal here is
to argue for the existence of all language types on a general level, whereby their
frequencies are not central. Moreover, for example ego-evidentials are rather
rare across languages, which naturally makes Type 2 less frequent, even though
it seems that ego-evidentials rather typically code general knowledge if they
exist in a language.
To begin with, the language types can be divided into two according to
whether they stress the differences, or the common features general knowledge
have with other information sources (Type 5 can be motivated in different ways).
The occurrence of Types 1 and 4 can be accounted for by the peculiar nature of
general knowledge; Type 1 has developed a specific marker for it, while lan-
guages of Type 4 leave it unmarked for evidentiality. The latter may follow, e. g.
because general knowledge does not have any kind of determinable information
source apart from the speaker’s internal knowledge, which makes evidentials
incompatible with it. Languages of Types 2 and 3, in turn, stress the similarities
of general knowledge and other information sources. First, ego-evidentials and
general knowledge are both the speaker’s own internal information, which
accounts for Type 2, and second, visual evidence and general knowledge are
both highly reliable information, which explains the occurrence of Type 3.
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The organization of this section is as follows. In 4.2, the close relation
between general knowledge and reliability of evidence will be discussed,
which will be followed by a discussion of general knowledge and (in)direct
evidence in Section 4.3. In Section 4.4, I will discuss the status of general
knowledge as an independent information source in more detail, while Section
4.5 discusses the theoretical implications this study has.
4.2 General knowledge and reliability of evidence
As noted above, general knowledge constitutes reliable information that the
speaker believes to be true. The high degree of reliability is based on our previous
experiences; we have deduced that certain states-of-affairs hold constantly, or we
have learnt things about the world from books, authorities, or other (reliable)
secondhand sources. General knowledge shares the high degree of reliability with
visual evidence and ego-evidence. It is very hard to deny general knowledge/facts
(especially of Type 1), or something we have done ourselves intentionally or some-
thing we have witnessed visually. The high degree of reliability also means that the
speaker can take personal responsibility for claims based on these evidence types
(see also Aikhenvald 2004: 189). All other kinds of evidence are somehow less
reliable, and the degree of speaker responsibility is thus lower. For example, even
though direct sensory evidence is usually necessary for inference, our inference
may be wrong, which makes statements based on inference (and assumption), less
reliable. Finally, in the case of hearsay evidence, we completely rely on information
from others, which excludes personal responsibility for these statements.
Consequently, markers of less direct evidence do not appear with general knowl-
edge; the conveyed message would be misleading as regards its reliability.
Even though general knowledge shares reliability and high degree of speaker
responsibility with ego-evidence and visual evidence, the motivation of reliability
varies drastically between these evidence types. Statements based on ego- or
visual evidence are based on concrete evidence. Moreover, the nature of the
evidence is known to the speaker, and s/he can specify it. For general knowledge,
in turn, the only type of evidence available is the speaker’s own internal evidence
and his/her view of the world. Consequently, the identical coding of general
knowledge and ego-/visual evidence does not follow from the nature of evidence
per se. It is interesting to note that in (8), where an ego-evidential is used for
coding general knowledge, the statement involves a first person agent, i. e. the
given piece of information concerns the speaker directly. This lends more support
to the personal nature of general knowledge, and very well explains why ego-
evidentials are used for coding general knowledge regardless of its origin.
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Even though ego-evidence, visual evidence and general knowledge all consti-
tute reliable evidence, differences may become evident if we have multiple types of
contradicting evidence available at the same time. For example, if we have believed
that John and Lisa have two children, but John himself tells us that they actually
have three, wewill (if we act rationally) change our world view accordingly. In other
words, directly observable and presently available evidence outranks the less
concrete evidence in this case. This is rather directly related to the subjective nature
of general knowledge, and also aids us in explaining why subjective certainty may
override non-linguistic reality and a non-fact may become general knowledge for
us. Moreover, the status of a piece of information as general knowledge is not
necessarily constant. We may forget things that used to be general knowledge for
us, whichmakes external evidence necessary. On the other hand, visual evidence is
in this sense more objective and harder to deny, which may result in us ranking it
higher in case more types of evidence are available.
The two types of general knowledge discussed briefly above display clear
differences in how other types of (highly reliable) evidence affects their truth
value. Since some scientific facts, especially generally known and constant
mathematic facts are very hard to deny, it is also difficult to have reliable
contradicting evidence against them. We are, for example, unlikely to change
our view on the fact 2 + 2 is 4, even though someone would make a case for
2 + 2 is 13. However, as scientists we are familiar with the fact that scientific
research changes our views of our field, and if provided with reliable evidence,
we are usually willing to change our thinking. For example, if someone is able to
convince us that there is a language that only has nasal vowels, the universal all
languages with nasal vowels also have oral vowels no longer is general knowl-
edge for us. The second type of general knowledge is, as noted above, less
constant, which has the consequence that it is also easier to have reliable
contradicting evidence for them. For example, if Bobby and Mary live in Boston
is general knowledge for us, and we learn from a reliable source that they have
moved to Anchorage, the new piece of information replaces the old piece of
information as our general knowledge. This can be seen as an instance of best
possible evidence (Faller 2002b); our world view is based on the most reliable
(and recent) evidence available.
4.3 General knowledge and direct/indirect evidentiality
Even though the coding of general knowledge could in principle be based on
both direct and indirect evidence (it has features in common with both types), it
comes as no surprise that (all?) languages treat general knowledge as direct
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evidence formally. Most importantly, as noted in the previous section, general
knowledge and direct evidence both present very reliable types of evidence,
which very well accounts for the use of direct evidentials. The coding is based on
the current information status of the given piece of information, i. e. it is relevant
to convey the message that the denoted information is reliable. The directness of
information is motivated very differently for general knowledge and, e. g. visual
evidence, but in both cases the speaker has direct access to the information.
Hearsay, inferential and assumptive evidentials, for their part, always constitute
indirect information, and the use of indirect evidentials with general knowledge
would lead to a wrong interpretation (see, e. g. Johanson 2003: 283 for a similar
note on Turkic languages). Hearsay evidence can be highly reliable if it comes
from a high authority, such as the police, but this is not manifested in its coding
(cf. Plungian 2010: 37). Also the less concrete nature of general knowledge is
irrelevant to its coding. Finally, miratives are also excluded from general knowl-
edge coding, because mirativity is related to the newness of information, while
general knowledge is by definition old information for the speaker.
Even though general knowledge is typically coded by direct evidentials, it is
in order to note that indirect evidentials are by no means excluded in construc-
tions describing general knowledge, but their use is related to functional differ-
ences, whose nature depends on the type of general knowledge. With the first
type of general knowledge, the use of indirect evidentials usually stresses the
fact that the given piece of evidence has just become general knowledge for the
speaker, or that the speaker has doubts about its truth value. This follows, since
the truth value of the given utterance does not depend in any way on the
speaker’s own evaluation of the state-of-affairs in question. With the second
type of general knowledge, the use of indirect evidentials deprives general
knowledge of its general knowledge status (the requirements for general knowl-
edge status are no longer fulfilled). In both cases, the result is thus a change
away from genuine general knowledge, but the exact nature of this varies.
As regards the directness of information, it is interesting to note that in some
languages with two or more direct evidentials (e. g. ego-evidential and a visual
evidential), the most direct evidential is employed for coding general knowledge.
For example, in Oksapmin, ego-evidentials are employed for coding general
knowledge instead of the visual-sensory evidential (see (8)). Of these, the ego-
evidential codes more direct information (Loughnane 2009: 254–255, see also
Shirai 2007: 133 for nDrapa). This also seems functionally natural, since ego-
evidentials are more compatible with general knowledge due to the internal
nature of these evidence types. In Qiang, general knowledge receives the
same formal treatment as highly reliable visual evidence, while less reliable visual
information is coded differently (LaPolla 2003: 198). This distribution is intriguing
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in light of the fact that in case the speaker has both general knowledge and other
highly reliable information at his/her disposal, s/he probably views, e. g. visual
information as more reliable than something s/he believed to be a fact (see
above). This is also related to the fact that it is easier to take full responsibility
for something we have witnessed recently and we can directly refer to.
4.4 The status of general knowledge as an independent
information source
To begin with, we may note that only a handful of languages accord general
knowledge dedicated formal coding, but the majority of languages treat general
knowledge as direct evidence. In other words, we only have little formal evi-
dence for stating that general knowledge should be viewed as an evidence type
of its own. However, two things should be taken into account here. First, also
auditive is viewed as an independent evidence type in those languages where it
is clearly an evidential category (see, e. g. Jalava 2017). Second, the very con-
sistent coding of general knowledge as direct evidence could be taken as
evidence for functional consistence of the notion; even though languages do
not accord general knowledge distinct formal coding, they nevertheless treat it
formally in a similar way across languages.
Semantic evidence for arguing for the independent nature of general knowl-
edge is considerably stronger. The dual nature of general knowledge is relevant
for this; general knowledge is highly reliable, yet non-concrete information. In
other words, we have subjective certainty of general knowledge even though we
do not have any kind of concrete directly observable evidence when referring to
it. With other information types, reliability of evidence correlates with concrete-
ness, and concrete, directly observable evidence, outranks less concrete evi-
dence in reliability. Moreover, general knowledge differs from other information
sources also in that the speaker can, at least to some extent, choose what kind of
evidence s/he uses for his/her statement. For example, we can use our internal
evidence for the statement Lisa has a PhD in linguistics, or we can prove this by
visiting Lisa’s homepage (see also Yliniemi 2017 for a similar remark on the use
of Denjongke copulas duʔ and bɛʔ). On the other hand, we cannot choose what
kind of evidence we have for John is now traveling to Montreal.
Second, as noted above, the nature of evidence changes when something
becomes general knowledge; information is no longer coded based on its original
source. On the other hand, e. g. hearsay evidence is always coded as hearsay
evidence as long as it remains mere hearsay evidence. The speaker’s focus is on
the factual nature of the given piece of information. S/he does not need to care
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about the original information source, because it does not affect the reliability of
his/her claim. The changes in the information status of general knowledge corre-
spond at least partly to what Yliniemi (2017) has described as information source
vs. type of knowledge; the information source may be the same for general
knowledge and other pieces of information, but the type of knowledge changes.
The heterogeneous nature of general knowledge, i. e. the contradiction
between reliability and concreteness, has the consequence that general knowl-
edge is harder to classify, e. g. based on directness of evidence (as on the list in
Section 1) than other evidence types. Basically, any kind of sensory perception is
necessarily direct evidence; we have direct access to it, and the evidence must
be concretely present. On the other hand, we cannot have visual evidence for
future events, or something we have not witnessed personally. Hearsay evi-
dence, in turn, is always indirect and non-concrete evidence, because it con-
stitutes other people’s information. General knowledge thus has features of both
direct and indirect evidence; reliability makes it similar to direct evidence, its
internal nature to ego-evidence, while its non-concrete (non-observable) nature
rather renders it indirect evidence. It also resembles assumption in that we do
not have any concrete (external) evidence for it. However, based on its formal
treatment, we may, if so desired, classify general knowledge as direct evidence
rather than indirect evidence. Put another way, reliability outranks non-con-
creteness as the determining factor here.
Finally, general knowledge constitutes a normal evidence type among
others in that we can make statements based on our general knowledge similarly
to any other evidence type. For example, the statement John and Lisa have two
children can be based on our general knowledge of the world, or we may have
visual evidence for this state-of-affairs. This does not underline the peculiar
nature of general knowledge in any way, but rather stresses the status of general
knowledge as an information source type among all others.
4.5 Theoretical implications for our general understanding
of evidentiality
The discussion in this section also contributes to our understanding of eviden-
tiality more generally. First, and perhaps foremost, the discussion has shown
that general knowledge constitutes an evidence type of its own, even though the
discussion has also shown that most languages code it by an already existing
mechanism. Semantic evidence for the distinction is more obvious and convinc-
ing. What distinguishes general knowledge from other evidence types is that
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general knowledge is harder “to put on a map”, i. e. general knowledge does not
constitute a homogeneous evidence type.
Second, this paper contributes to our understanding of evidentiality sys-
tems and the classification of evidence types. As shown above, most languages
treat general knowledge as direct evidence formally. This stresses the distinc-
tion between direct and indirect evidence, and in so doing between reliable
and non-reliable evidence, and the relevance of this distinction to the nature of
evidentiality systems. Plungian (2010) bases his distinction between directness
and indirectness on one hand, and personal vs. non-personal nature of the
evidence, on the other. Languages, where general knowledge is coded as direct
evidence, many instances of direct evidence are lumped together, and these
languages formally distinguish between direct and indirect evidence regardless
of its nature. In general, languages seem to make more distinctions in the
coding of indirect evidence, as shown by Aikhenvald (2004: Ch. 2). There are
also languages, where the only explicit formal distinction is based on direct-
ness of evidence (like Cherokee and Yukaghir, discussed in Aikhenvald 2004:
26–27). This distinction is also clear in Finnish, where information source is left
implicit for all instances of reliable/direct evidence including general knowl-
edge. On the other hand, Finnish has evidential particles for different instances
of less reliable evidence. We may also add that the differences between direct
and indirect (and/or reliable and non-reliable) evidence are communicatively
more relevant than the differences between, e. g. visual evidence and general
knowledge.
The nature of evidentiality systems is also closely related to the emergence
of evidentiality systems. Dedicated general knowledge/factual evidentials are, as
illustrated in Section 3, rather uncommon across languages, and in my data
there are no languages where this kind of evidential would be the sole eviden-
tial. This means that general knowledge evidentials do not constitute an early
stage of development. The development rather starts with more obvious and
relevant differences, and the first evidential to emerge is some kind of second-
hand/hearsay evidential (e. g. Estonian only has a grammaticalized marker for
hearsay evidence). As argued by Faller (2002b), speakers use the best possible
evidence for their claims, which is in typical cases illustrated by direct/visual
evidence, in many languages also including general knowledge. Hearsay evi-
dence is maximally distinct from direct evidence, which makes it important to
underline this difference explicitly. Similarly, languages with a dual and a plural
first grammaticalize plural marking, since it is maximally different from the
singular. On the other hand, general knowledge has many features in common
with other instances of direct evidence, which makes explicit coding of this
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difference communicatively redundant, and thus rather rare across languages.
This also manifests their late development.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, the status of general knowledge as a source of information has
been discussed. General knowledge was defined as pieces of information that
the speaker has absolute subjective certainty of without having to resort to some
external evidence, such as visual or hearsay evidence at the time when a
sentence coding general knowledge is uttered. General knowledge has become
an established part of the speaker’s world view, which renders additional
evidence redundant. The semantic nature of general knowledge speaks in
favor of viewing it as an independent information source, but general knowl-
edge also has features in common with other information sources.
In addition to discussing the semantics of general knowledge, a formal-
functional typology of its coding was proposed. Languages were divided into
five types according to the nature of the evidential marker used for referring to
general knowledge; languages either have a dedicated marker for them, they use
another (visual/direct or ego) evidential for coding them, or general knowledge
is coded by zero (lack of evidentials). No languages were found in which
inferential, assumptive or hearsay evidentials would be employed for this (this
is attested for folklore, but this type of general knowledge was not taken into
account in this study). The sample used for this study is, however, rather small,
which means that the occurrence of languages where hearsay evidentials are
used for the coding of general knowledge cannot be completely excluded. More
detailed studies are needed to (dis)confirm this, as well as to shed more light on
the actual frequencies of the five language types of the proposed typology. The
five types differ from each other in whether they stress the similarities with or
differences from other information sources; Types 1 and 4 stress the differences,
while Types 2 and 3 are rather based the features general knowledge shares with
other information source, most notably the reliability of information. In Type 5,
this may vary according to the types involved in the variation.
The present study is only the first step towards a better understanding of
general knowledge as an evidential category. Many aspects have only been
touched upon, or not discussed at all in this brief overview. It is therefore my
hope that other studies will follow on all possible aspects of general knowledge.
First of all, it would be important to study the frequencies of the types in more
detail; is it indeed the case that Type 1 is not very common across languages,
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while Type 4 is attested frequently? Is Type 5 attested in the majority of
languages, or at least in a higher number of them? Does the proposed typology
exhaust the attested types, or is yet a further coding strategy possible? How
often can zero be used for coding general knowledge in languages, where
evidentiality is basically an obligatory category? What kind of functions do
other than ego- or direct/visual evidentials acquire in languages where eviden-
tiality is an obligatory category? All of these questions lie outside the scope of
the present paper, but it is my sincere hope that other scholars working on
evidentiality will discuss them in the future, both within and across languages.
Appendix: Abbreviations
ANAPH Anaphora
ASS Assertive
ASSUM Assumed
AUD Auditive
CL Classifier
CND Conditional
COMPL Completive
COP Copula
CRT Certaintive
DAT Dative case
DEF Definite
DEM Demonstrative
DEMPH Deictic emphatic
DIR Direct evidential
DISJ Disjunct
DST Distal
EGO Ego-evidential
EQU Equative
EV Evidential
EX Exclusive
EXT Existential
EX.F Factual existential copula
EX.T Testimonial existential copula
FACT Factual
FOC Focus
FP Far past
GEN Genitive
HAB Habitual
IND Indicative
INF Infinitive
INFR Inferential
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IPF Imperfective
LOC Locative
M Masculine
NE Neutral
NF Non-feminine
NMLZ Nominalization
NOM Nominative
NONVIS Non-visual
P Person
PART Partitive
PAST Past tense
PER Personal-factual evidential
PERF Perfect
PERS Personal
PL Plural
PN Personal name
POSS Possessive
PRES Present tense
PROGR Progressive
REC.P Recent past
REFL Reflexive
REP Reported
SEN.INF Sensory-inferential
SEQ Sequential
SG Singular
SUBJ Subject
TOP Topic
VIS Visual
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